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AN EPOCH IN THE HISTORY OF NATIONAL
BANKING ASSOCIATIONS
By WILLIAM L. TRAVIS-
Congress, in the exercise of its authority, has power to
create a bank,1 and the National Bank Act of 1864, creating
a system of national banks as agencies of the Federal Govern-
ment to provide a national currency, is constitutional.2 Being
creations of Congress, such associations enjoy only the statu-
tory powers granted them and such incidental powers as may
be necessary to carry out the intent and purpose for which
the express powers are conferred. "The measure of their
powers is the statutory grant and powers not conferred by
Congress are denied. For the Act under which national banks
are organized, constitutes a complete system for their gov-
ernment."8 In the words of the Supreme Court, "Authority
is thus given to transact such a banking business as is specified,
and all incidental powers necessary to carry it on are granted.
These powers are such as are required to meet all the legiti-
mate demands of the authorized business, and to enable a
bank to conduct its affairs, within the general scope of its
charter, safely and prudently." 4
The chief purpose of this article is to present, from a re-
view of recent expressions of the courts, a number of definite
*Of the Hammond Bar.
1 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 45 L. Ed. 579; Farmers Nat. Bank
v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29, 23 L. Ed. 196, Pollard v. State, 65 Ala. 628; Flint v.
Boston, 99 Mass. 141, 96 Am. Dec. 713; Stetson v. Bangor, 56 Me. 274.
2 Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U. S. 275, 16 S. Ct. 502, 40 L. Ed. 700,
and cases cited supra n. 1.
3 Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pottorff, 291 U. S. 245, 54 S. Ct. 416, 78 L. Ed.
777 (1934); First Nat. Bank v. Missouri, 263 U. S. 640; First Nat. Bank v.
Converse, 200 U. S. 425, 439, 26 S. Ct. 306, 50 L. Ed. 537; First Nat. Bank v.
Hawkins, 174 U. S. 364, 19 S. Ct. 739, 43 L. Ed. 1007, California Nat. Bank
v. Kennedy, 167 U. S. 362, 17 S. Ct. 831, 42 L. Ed. 198; Logan County Nat.
Bank v. Townsend, 139 U. S. 67, 73, 11 S. Ct. 496, 35 L. Ed. 107, 110; Char-
lotte First Nat. Bank v. National Exchange Bank, 92 U. S. 122, 128, 23 L. Ed.
679, 681; Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Smith, 56 F (2d) 799 (1932); Williams v.
Merchants Nat. Bank, 42 F. (2d) 243.
4 Charlotte First Nat. Bank v. National Exchange Bank, supra n. 3.
INDIANA L.AJY JOURNAL
and indicated limitations imposed upon national banking asso-
ciations and to record a few ultra vires practices that have
been indulged in by some of them under an erroneous concep-
tion of their powers. Such a review will not only show that a
banking practice commonly pursued may be illegal,5 but will
also exhibit a tendency on the part of the courts to confine
such banks strictly to the exercise of their chartered powers,
while Congress progressively broadens the field of their ac-
tivities."
II
GENERAL POWERS
In addition to the usual banking and corporate powers nec-
essary for their organization, operation, and management,
national banks, by the Act of June 3, 1864, in general terms,
were given the power to have succession for twenty years,
which was later increased to ninety-nine years7 and still later
to an unlimited time subject to termination only by Congress,
forfeiture, dissolution or insolvency;" to make contracts; to
sue and be sued, complain and defend in any court of law or
equity, as fully as natural persons, and to exercise all such
incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the busi-
ness of banking, by discounting commercial paper, by receiving
deposits, by buying and selling exchange, coin and bullion,
by loaning money on personal security, by obtaining, issuing
and circulating notes as provided by law.9 The definition of
these powers, in the main, is self-explanatory and requires no
particular comment, except for the construction of the power
to make contracts, and the incidental powers as shall be neces-
sary to carry on the business of banking. The general phrase-
ology employed in granting those two powers has given
5 Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pottorff, supra n. 3.
6 Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pottorff, supra n. 3.
7 R. S. Sec. 5136 and 12 U. S. C. A. Sec. 24, as amended by Act of July 1,
1922, c. 257, 42 Stat. 767
8 R. S. Sec. 5136 and 12 U. S. C. A. Sec. 24, as amended by Act of Feb. 25,
1927, c. 191, Sec. 2, 44 Stat. 1226, June 16, 1933, c. 89, Sec. 16, 48 Stat. 184,
Aug. 23, 1935, c. 614, Sec. 308, 49 Stat. 709, 12 U. S. C. A. Supp. 1935, Sec. 24.
9R. S. Sec. 5136, as amended, 12 U. S. C. A. Supp. 1935, Sec. 24.
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birth to considerable litigation from which we may now
derive a fairly accurate conception of the scope and limitations
of those two grants of power, and, because many of the
activities of a bank, directly or indirectly, touch upon and
are concerned with the exercise of those two powers, much
of this effort will be focused upon the meaning of those
clauses of the Act, as interpreted by the courts.
Although given the power to make contracts, it is obvious
that the grant is limited, not only by the other provisions of
the same section from which that power is derived and by
Section 82 of the same title, but also by the further limitation
that the scope of the banking business must be confined to
conducting the charter powers safely and prudently,10 which
as we shall hereafter note, restricts the activities in dealing
in investment securities and in securing repayment of deposits.
III
POWER TO DEAL IN INVESTMENT SECURITIES
National banks were specifically given power by the amend-
ment to Section 24 of the Act" to deal in investment
securities without recourse. The term, "without recourse",
as used in the Act, has been held to mean without recourse
in its broad and non-technical sense, precluding any form
of arrangement or agreement in consequence of which a
national bank is obligated to save a purchaser harmless from
loss incurred as a result of his purchase, and hence a contract
entered into contemporaneously with a sale, to repurchase
bonds sold to a customer at par, violates the statute and is
ultra vires, unenforceable, and the bank is not estopped to
disaffirm the contract because the customer is chargeable with
knowledge of the bank's limited power to contract. 12
10 Charlotte First Nat. Bank v. National Exchange Bank, supra n. 3,
Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pottorff, supra n. 3; Eastern Township Bank v. Ver-
mont Nat. Bank, 22 Fed. 186.
11 R. S. Sec. 5136 and 12 U. S. C. A. See. 24, as amended by Act of Feb.
25, 1927, supra n. 8.
12 Awotin v. Atlas Exchange Nat. Bank, 295 U. S. 209, 55 S. Ct. 674, 79
L. Ed. 1393 (1935), aff'g. 275 Ill. App. 530; Kimen v. Atlas Exchange Nat.
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Since June 16, 1934, the effective date of the Amendment
of 1933 to Section 24, the business of dealing in securities
and stocks has been limited "to purchasing and selling such
securities and stocks without recourse, solely upon the order,
and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own
account, and the association shall not underwrite any issue
of securities or stock- Provided, that the association may
purchase for its own account investment securities under such
limitations and restrictions as the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency may by regulation provide."' 13 Definition of the term,
"investment securities", is left to the discretion of the
Comptroller, but in a general way is declared to be, . . .
"marketable obligations . . . in the form of bonds, notes
and/or debentures." Certain obligations of the United States,
the several states and their political subdivisions are exempted
from the limitation. No authority is granted by the Act to
acquire shares of stock in any corporation, but investment in
stock in a company engaged in the safe-deposit business is
permitted to the extent of fifteen per cent of its unimpaired
and fully paid capital stock and surplus.
Prior to the enactment of the Amendment in 1927 con-
ferring the qualified power to deal in such securities, national
banks, while not expressly prohibited, were impliedly pro-
hibited by a failure to grant the power, from dealing in stocks
or bonds of other corporations except when such securities
were acquired as collateral or in settlement of a debtor's
obligations. 14  The power is now exercised under the super-
Bank, 295 U. S. 215, 55 S. Ct. 677, 79 L. Ed. 1398, Greene v. First Nat. Bank,
172 Minn. 310, 215 N. W 213. Cf. Citizens Nat. Bank v. Pigford (Allen), -
Miss. -, 167 So. 627 (1936), Docketed by U. S. Supreme Ct. Aug. 11, 1936,
Citizens Nat. Bank v. Golden, - Miss. -, 166 So. 745 (1936), Docketed U. S.
Supreme Ct. Aug. 1936, and Citizens Nat. Bank v. Bullard, - Miss. -, 168
So. 52, Docketed U. S. Supreme Ct. Aug. 1936; (holding national bank liable
for damages for deceit and fraudulent representations as to bonds being repre-
sented as guaranteed by surety companies, notwithstanding R. S. Sec. 5136,
parag. (7) as amended.)
13R. S. Sec. 5136, as amended by Act of Feb. 25, 1927, 12 U. S. C. A.
Supp. 1935, Sec. 24(7).
14 McCreery v. Equitable Bank, 203 U. S. 584; First Nat. Bank v. Con-
verse, supra n. 3, Shaw v. National German Bank, 199 U. S. 603, 26 S. Ct.
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vision and control of the Comptroller to a large extent under
the Act of 1933.
IV
POWER TO SECURE REPAYMENT OF DEPOSITS
By the Act of 1864 and amendments thereto' 5 national
banks are designated as depositaries of public monies and
financial agents of the United States, and authorized to give
satisfactory security for such deposits. Prior to the Amend-
ment of June 25, 1930,10 great uncertainty existed over the
question as to whether the power to receive public deposits
and give security for their safe-keeping was restricted to
deposits of the Federal Government and its instrumentalities,
or whether the Act was broad enough to cover public deposits
also of any state or its political subdivisions. If it were held
that no such power existed under the above provision, then
the inquiry arose as to whether the power might be exercised
as a necessary incident to the power to receive deposits and
to carry on the banking business.
Recently the Supreme Court of the United States definitely
determined that prior to the Amendment of 1930 such banks
had no power to give security, by pledging its assets, to secure
any public deposits of a state or its political subdivisions,
notwithstanding a contrary assumption prevailing among the
officers charged with administration oi the Act; and the Court
expressed the further opinion that, since the Amendment of
1930, such association may pledge their assets and give
security for such public funds only when located in a state
in which state banks are similarly authorized.' 7
750, 50 L. Ed. 328; Scott v. DeWeese, 181 U. S. 202, 21 S. Ct. 585, 45 L. Ed.
822; Robinson v. Southern National Bank, 180 U. S. 295, 21 S. Ct. 383, 389, 45
L. Ed. 536; First Nat. Bank v. Hawkins, supra n. 3; California Nat. Bank v.
Kennedy, supra n. 3, Charlotte First Nat. Bank v. National Exchange Bank,
supra n. 3, Schofield v. Goodrich, 98 Fed. 271; First Nat. Bank of Vernon v.
Federal Land Bank, 93 Ind. App. 15, 177 N. E. 462 (1931).
15 R. S. Sec. 5153, 12 U. S. C. A. Sec. 90.
16 R. S. Sec. 5153, as amended June 25, 1930, c. 604, 46 Stat. 809; 12 U. S.
C. A. Supp. 1935, Sec. 90.
17 City of Marion v. Sneeden, 291 U. S. 262, 54 S. Ct. 421, 78 L. Ed. 787
(1934).
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In another case decided on the same day the Court held
that such banks, both before and since the amendment, have
been without power to give security for private deposits. 18
This holding refutes and repudiates the contention that the
exercise of the power to pledge security for safe-keeping is
a necessary incident to receiving deposits. On the contrary,
the Court took the position that such a practice is inimical
to safe banking, tends to destroy confidence in banks, and
preclude the uniform treatment intended to be accorded by
the ratable distribution provisions of the National Bank Act
relating to administration of insolvent institutions.
The Amendment of 1930, hereinabove referred to, pro-
vides that: "Any association may, upon the deposit with it
of public money of a State or any political subdivision thereof,
give security for the safe-keeping and prompt payment of the
money so deposited, of the same kind as is authorized by the
law of the State in which such association is located in the
case of other banking institutions in the state."' 9  (Italics
mine). It is apparent that the portions of the amendment
italicized above are subject to wide and variable interpreta-
tions. An attempt will be made, therefore, to devote some
consideration to the terminology used and to the interpreta-
tions placed upon the subject clauses by the courts in recent
cases.
While the Supreme Court declared in the City of Marion
decision 20 that the Amendment empowers national banks to
secure deposits of a State or its political subdivision only in
states where state banks are so authorized, it did not attempt
to define what is meant by "public money", nor what funds
constitute "monies of a State or political subdivision thereof",
nor what is "security", nor what is deemed to be "the law
of the State", nor what methods may be employed in the
exercise of the power granted. However, many of those
questions have been answered and a fairly well defined con-
ception of the terms and effect of the Amendment has been
outlined by the precedents now established by the courts.
18 Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pottorff, supra n. 3 (1933).
19 Supra n. 16. 20 Supra, n. 17.
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The term "public money of a State or political subdivision
thereof" has been held not to include a deposit of litigants'
awards by a clerk of a state court ;21 nor bankruptcy funds,
generally ;21 "- nor a deposit of a state bank's receiver,
whether appointed by a state court or by the state banking
commissioner.2 2  On the other hand, it has been held that
where costs and fees are recognized as public funds under
the state depositary law, such funds, when deposited by the
proper clerk of a court chargeable with their custody, con-
stitute public funds of the county, as a political subdivision
of the state, within the purview of the Act.23  Deposits by the
Comptroller of Currency, consisting of assets of insolvent
national banks, are permitted to be secured under authority of
another section, but this privilege does not extend to securing
deposits of the United States Shipping Board Merchant Fleet
Corporation, nor to deposits of the Alien Property Custod-
ian.24  A pledge made to a road district in Texas has been
held not to come within the permitted classes.2 5  However,
a pledge made to a town in a state where the public policy
of that state permits such pledges to be made by its state
banks, is valid;2 6 and a pledge made prior to 1930, but
approved subsequent to the effective date of the amendment
of that year, securing deposits of a city treasurer, has been
held valid.2 7  Furthermore, it has been held that where a
good faith effort has been made, the mere failure to strictly
21Utter v. Eckerson, 78 F (2d) 307 (1935).
21'A Irving Trust Co. v. U. S., 83 F (2d) 20 (1936), Phelps v. Citizens
Union National, 13 F Supp. 623 (1936).
22 Griffin v. Royal, 70 F (2d) 103 (1934), Harrell v. Lawhead, 13 F.
Supp. 298 (1936).
23 Utter v. Eckerson, supra n. 21 (1935).
24 O'Connor v. Rhodes, 79 F (2d) 146, aff'd - U. S. -, 80 L. Ed. 143
(1936), construing R. S. Sec. 5234, 12 U. S. C. A. Sec. 192.
25 Pottorff v. El-Paso Hudspeth Road Dist., 62 F (2d) 498 (1935), cert.
den. 289 U. S. 724, 53 S. Ct. 522, 77 L. Ed. 1474 (1933).
26 Standard Inv. Co. v. Snow Hill, 78 F (2d) 33 (1935) ; Hellawell v.
Hempstead, 10 F. Supp. 771 (1935).
27 Ross v. Knott, 13 F Supp. 963 (1936), Haynes v. Woodward, 6 F Supp.
270 (1934).
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comply with a state depositary law will not vitiate a pledge,
if otherwise permitted ;28 nor will the mere failure of the
board of directors to adopt a resolution approving the pledge
render it void.29
The meaning of "security . . . of the same kind as is
authorized by the law of the state . . .", is indicated by a
recent decision of the Supreme Court wherein it was held
that the term is not restricted to include a pledge of specific
assets only, but embraces also the giving of a bond with surety
and creating a lien on all of the bank's assets as security for
the prompt payment of the deposit.80 The Court gave the
word "security" a liberal interpretation, in order, as the
Court stated, that hational banks might be placed upon an
equal footing with state banks and thereby give effect to the
paramount purpose of the amendment to prevent unfair and
destructive competition between the two banking systems.
The laws and decisions of the courts of any given state
must control the question as to whether state banks have the
power to give security of a kind sought to be hypothecated
by a national bank doing business in such state, and the law
of any such state is expressed by constant practices, by the
interpretations of the officials charged with supervision over
such banks, and by the statutory, constitutional, or judicial
pronouncements of the state.3 1  While it is recognized that
national banks are Federal instrumentalities and controlled by
the paramount law of the United States, nevertheless, they
are subject to state laws unless the latter are in conflict with
some Federal law, or unless the state law tends to impair or
defeat the purpose intended by the National Bank Act. 32
The Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, in a very
current case dealing with the amendment of 1930, in succinct
language said, "To summarize our views under this heading,
28 Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Pottorff, supra n. 3 (1933); Capital Loan & Say.
Assn. v. Olympia Nat. Bank, 80 F (2d) 561 (1936) ; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v.
Kokrda, 66 F (2d) 641 (1933).
29Kavanaugh v. Fash, 74 F (2d) 435 (1935).
30 Lewis v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 292 U. S. 559, 54 S. Ct. 848, 78 L. Ed.
1425, 92 A. L. R. 803 (1934).
32 Lewis v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., supra n. 30 (1934), citing cases.
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therefore, we hold that the appellants are entitled to invoke
the state statutes for the purpose of ascertaining whether any
security for public deposits is permitted by state law, and, if
so, what kind, but not for the purpose of questioning the size
of the public deposit, or the amount of security given by the
bank; for the provisions of state law as to amount of security
or of public deposits are for the protection of the state and
not of banks .... "
"Furthermore where the public policy of a state favors
the protection of public deposits by means of security to be
given by depositaries, contracts for that purpose will be sus-
tained, regardless of technical deficiencies." 33
It now seems to be recognized that the giving of security
for public deposits may be accomplished by a pledge of assets
to a surety on the bank's depositary bond, in lieu of a pledge
direct to the depositor, and this is so because, while the
amendment limits the giving of security to the same kind as
is authorized by the law of the state, it is not limited to giving
it in the same manner.34
V
MISCELLANEOUS REGULATIONS- DIRECTORS' QUALIFICA-
TIONS - LOAN LIMITS-INTEREST RATES - REAL
ESTATE LOANS
New regulations have been imposed upon a national bank-
ing association requiring its directors, consisting of not less
than five nor more than twenty-five, to be bona fide owners
of stock in such association of a par value of not less than
twenty-five hundred dollars; and, requiring each director to
be a citizen of the United States, and not less than three-
33 Capital Say. & Loan Assn. v. Olympia Nat. Bank, supra n. 28 (1936).
34 Capital Say. & Loan Assn. v. Olympia Nat. Bank, supra n. 28 (1936);
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Kokrda, supra n. 28 (1933), Ross v. Knott, supra
n. 27 (1936), Haynes v. U. S. F & G. Co., 6 F. Supp. 272 (1934). Cf. Lewis
v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., supra n. 30 (1934), where the surety company, as
assignee of State Treasurer, was permitted to enforce a lien created in favor
of the depositor by a Georgia statute against the bank's assets.
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fourths of them to be residents of the state in which the bank
is situated, or within a radius of fifty miles thereof.35
The total obligations of any person, company, corporation,
or firm to a national bank can not exceed ten per cent of the
unimpaired, paid in capital and surplus. 30 By the latest
amendment the term "obligations" has been specifically de-
fined.3 7
The former section of the Act fixing interest rates38 has
been amended to provide an option to collect interest at rates
not exceeding one per cent in excess of the discount rate on
ninety day commercial paper at the Federal Reserve Bank
of the district, or at the rate prescribed for state banks, or
at seven per cent if there be no rate fixed by state law, which-
ever is greater, and branch banks are governed by the rate
prevailing in the place where the branch is located. 39
Loans on improved real estate, including improved farm
and residential properties, secured by first liens are now au-
thorized to be made by such banks,40 and they may acquire
obligations so secured, when the entire amount thereof is sold
to the purchasing bank. Such loans may not exceed fifty per
cent of the appraised value of the securing property, and may
mature not later than five years, unless they be amortized
loans for not more than sixty per cent of the appraised value,
which may, in that event, mature over a ten year period with
the installments amortizing at least forty per cent of the
principal within the first ten years. Real estate loans are
limited to an aggregate amount not exceeding the unimpaired
paid in capital stock and surplus, or sixty per cent of its time
and savings deposits, which ever is greater.
35 12 U. S. C. A. Supp. 1935, Sees. 71a, 72.
36 R. S. Sec. 5200, as amended, 12 U. S. C. A. Supp. 1935, Sec. 84-. First
mortgage bonds of a manufacturing company held by a national bank, where
such bonds are not readily marketable nor widely distributed, have been held
not to be "investment securities" in which such bank might acquire up to 25%
of its capital and surplus, but "obligations" within the meaning of the above
section limiting purchases to not more than 10%, notwithstanding Act of Feb.
25, 1927, 44 Stat. 1226, 12 U. S. C. A. See. 24(7), Anderson v. Akers, 7 F
Supp. 924. 37 Supra n. 36.
38 R. S. Sec. 5197, 12 U. S. C. A. Sec. 85.
30 12 U. S. C. A. Supp. 1935, Sec. 85.
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A provision of the same section, immediately hereinabove
referred to, authorizes such banks to "make such loans in an
aggregate sum including in such aggregate any such loans
on which it is liable as indorser or guarantor or otherwise
equal to 25 per centum of the amount of the capital stock
of such association actually paid in and unimpaired and 25
per centum of its unimpaired surplus fund, or to one-half of
its savings deposits, at the election of the association subject
to the general limitation contained in section 84 of this title."
It is not clear what is meant by the term "loans on which it is
liable as indorser or guarantor, or otherwise". Heretofore,
the policy of the Congress41 has been to prevent national
banks from becoming liable as indorser, guarantor, or surety
for another's benefit, and such contracts or engagements by
which they might become so liable have been held to be ultra
vires, void, and unenforceable. 42  It is assumed, therefore,
that the Act of 1935 does not remove the inhibitions against
becoming liable as indorser, surety, or guarantor for another,
but merely reaffirms the right to indorse or guarantee negoti-
able obligations upon transferring or discounting them in
the ordinary course of business, which has been recognized
as the exercise of a legitimate and necessary incidental
power.43
40 12 U. S. C. A. Supp. 1935, Sec. 371. See also the regulations issued by
the Comptroller of Currency Sept. 4, 1935, 3 U. S. L. Wk. 26.
41 See: 12 U. S. C. A. Supp. 1935, Sec. 24; 12 LT. S. C. A. Sec. 92; 12 U. S.
C. A. Supp. 1935, Sec. 92.
42Farmers & Miners Bank v. Bluefield Nat. Bank, 11 F (2d) 83 (1926),
cert. den. 46 S. Ct. 483, Mowen v. Needles Nat. Bank, 94 Fed. 925, aff'g. 87
Fed. 430, cert. den. 176 U. S. 682, 20 S. Ct. 1024, 44 L. Ed. 637 (1900), Con-
solidated Nat. Bank v. Anglo & London Paris Bank, 34 Ariz. 160, 269 Pac.
68, cert. dismissed as improvndently granted 280 U. S. 526, 50 S. Ct. 87, 74
L. Ed. 593 (1929), Border Nat. Bank v. American National, 282 Fed. 73,
app. dismissed 260 U. S. 701, 43 S. Ct. 96, 67 L. Ed. 471, Barron v. McKinnon,
179 Fed. 759; Peoples Nat. Bank v. Southern States Finance Co. (N. C.), 133
S. E. 415, Tallapoosa First Nat. Bank v. Monroe, 135 Ga. 614, 69 S. E. 1123, 32
L. R. A. (N. S.) 550; McQueen v. First Nat. Bank, 36 Ariz. 74, 283 Pac. 273
(1929), Ellis v. Citizens National, 25 N. M. 319, 183 Pac. 34, 6 A. L. R. 166,
Board of Comm. of Lake County v. Citizens Trust & Say. Bank (Ind. App.),
123 N. E. 130; and cases cited to 12 U. S. C. A. Sec. 24, n. 101-104 inc.
4 3 Peoples Bank v. Manufacturer's Nat. Bank, 101 U. S. 181, 25 L. Ed. 907,
Bowen v. Needles Nat. Bank, supra n. 42; Farmers and Miners Bank v. Blue-
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If a national bank could be said to be empowered, by the
foregoing provision, to make itself liable in the capacity as
indorser, surety, or guarantor upon real estate bonds evidenc-
ing loans upon real property, the Act of 1935 would, indeed,
violate the long established policy of Congress denying such
power. If any such effect were intended, it is difficult to
understand why the restrictions upon dealing in investment
securities are retained. 44  It is believed, therefore, that the
Act merely contemplated that such obligations, incurred
within the usual course of business as heretofore permitted,
should be included in a computation of the aggregate of this
type of loans permitted by the loan limits.
Loans for the construction of buildings on such properties,
maturing within six months, are not considered as real estate
loans, but are classed as commercial loans. Immediately
following the clause relating to construction loans is a proviso
to the effect that such banks may not invest in, or be liable
on any such loans in an aggregate amount in excess of fifty
per cent of its unimpaired, paid in capital. This proviso
appears to apply only to the subject immediately preceding it,
namely, loans on construction of buildings, maturing within
six months. At least, this interpretation would follow if the
general rule of statutory construction relating to provisos is
followed.45
VI
TRUST POWERS AND DUTIES
National banks derive their power from the Federal Re-
serve Act to perform fiduciary functions.46 Under a delega-
tion of authority the Federal Reserve Board is given power
to permit national banks to act as trustees, executors, admin-
istrators, registrars of stocks and bonds, guardians, assignees,
receivers, committees for lunatics, or in any other fiduciary
capacity in which state banks are permitted to act under the
law of a state in which such associations are located.
field Nat. Bank, supra n. 42; Peoples Nat. Bank v. Southern States Finance Co.,
supra n. 42; Thomas v. City Nat. Bank, 40 Neb. 501, 58 N. W. 943, 24 L. R.
A. 263. 44 12 U. S. C. A. Supp. 1935, Sec. 24.
45 59 C. J. 1090, Sec. 640. 46 12 U. S. C. A. Sec. 248(k).
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The Act requires the banks exercising fiduciary duties to
segregate the assets of the trust estate from the general assets
of the bank and to keep a separate trust department reflecting
its trust and other fiduciary transactions. Funds so held are
not to be used by the bank unless it first sets aside securing
assets, approved by the Board, to secure their repayment. In
the event of a failure of the bank, the beneficiaries of such
deposits or funds so held have a lien on the securing assets
in addition to their general claim, so that, while no preference
is given, it is generally recognized that as to such secured funds
the claimants may receive dividends on the full amount of
their claims until those dividends, added to the amount
realized from the proceeds of the sale of the securing assets,
are sufficient to satisfy those claims in full.47  This is known
as the "English Chancery Rule", which prevails in the Fed-
eral courts; but elsewhere either the "Bankruptcy Rule",
allowing a claim for the balance only after deductions for
payments made out of proceeds of the collateral, or the
"Maryland Rule", providing for the computation of dividends
on the balance due at any dividend period after crediting
previous dividends, is invoked.48 The Banking Act of 1935,
insofar as fiduciary transactions are concerned, has not
changed the substance of the Act except to provide a method
whereby banks could surrender their trust duties. 40
The grant of power to act as fiduciaries imposes a further
restriction in that no deposits subject to check, or the deposit
of checks, drafts, bills of exchange or other items for collec-
tion, are permitted to be received in the trust department,
but this restriction has been so construed that a deposit in the
trust department, under a contract specifying that same might
be transferred to any person on order of the depositor, is
not deprived of the securing lien as a trust deposit, where it
47 Aldrich v. Chemical Nat. Bank, 176 U. S. 618, 20 S. Ct. 498, 44 L. Ed.
611, Merrell v. National Bank, 173 U. S. 131, 19 S. Ct. 360, 43 L. Ed. 640;
Capital Say. & Loan Assn. v. Olympia Nat. Bank, supra n. 28 (1936), Gamble
v. Wimberly, 44 F (2d) 329; Washington v. Dexter Nat. Bank, 263 Fed. 304.
Contra: American Surety Co. v. National Bank, 17 F (2d) 942.
48 3 Michie, Banks & Banking, 218, Sec. 158.
49 12 U. S. C. A. Supp. 1935, Sec. 248(k).
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was designated on the trust ledger as "uninvested trust
funds" and was, in fact, awaiting investment." The bank it-
self, as distinguished from its customers, in the ordinary
course of its fiduciary functions may deposit such trust funds
in the trust department.51
Although the delegation of power to the Federal Reserve
Board to permit associations to act as fiduciaries has been
attacked as an unconstitutional delegation of power by Con-
gress,52 it is now well settled that the delegation of authority
to the Board and the exercise of the power by the banks is
constitutional,5 3 and takes precedence over any laws of the
states attempting to deny the exercise of such fiduciary du-
ties.54
Assuming that a national bank, acting as a fiduciary, de-
posited trust funds in its commercial department instead of
in its trust department-could it be said that the cestui would
thereby be deprived of the benefit of the lien of the securing
assets posted to secure the trust department liabilities? Log-
ically, and in good conscience, it would seem that the bank's
act could not defeat the beneficiary's right to the protection
afforded by the posted securities, because the provisions of
the Act requiring segregation appear to be mandatory, and
the courts would probably say that the omission on the part
of the bank to do what is required to do could not alter the
relationship nor defeat the claimant's right to a secured claim.
Unfortunately this rule has not yet been clearly enunciated,
but it is supported to some extent, at least, by two district
court decisions. 5
50 Richman v. First Methodist Church, 76 F (2d) 344, cert. den. Long v.
First Methodist Church, 56 S. Ct. 107, 80 L. Ed. 109 (1935).
51 Carcaba v. McNair, 68 F (2d) 793 (1935).
52 People v. Brady, 271 Ill. 100, 110 N. E. 864.
53 First National Bank v. Fellows, 244 U. S. 416, 37 S. Ct. 734, 61 L. Ed.
1233, L. R. A. 1918C 283, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 1169 (1917), rev'. Fellows v. First
Nat. Bank, 192 Mich. 640, 159 N. W 335.
54 U. S. v. Duncan, 265 U. S. 19, 44 S. Ct. 427, 68 L. Ed. 881 (1924), rev.
State ex rel. Burnes v. Duncan, 302 Mo. 130, 257 S. W. 784.
55 Taylor v. Picher, 13 F Supp. 857 (1936), Marvin v. First National, 10
F Supp. 275 (1935).
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VII
EFFECT OF CONSOLIDATION ON FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS
OF CONSOLIDATED AND CONSTITUENT BANKS
The provisions of the National Bank Act as originally
enacted5 ' invited considerable apprehension concerning the
effect of the consolidation of two national banks, or the con-
version of a state bank into a national bank, or the consolida-
tion of a state bank with another bank under the charter of a
national banking association.57  Because of the failure of
Congress to provide the states with visitorial or supervisory
control over national banks exercising fiduciary functions, no
little amount of opposition was encountered by such associa-
tions from the several states which inclined to the view that
the Federal agencies were invading a field believed to be
peculiarly within the exclusive domain of the states.5
In a rather recent case 50 before the United States Supreme
Court, it was contended in the briefs and arguments that the
Federal Government, in the exercise of its admitted power
to create fiscal agencies, has power, if necessity demands, to
preserve those instrumentalities from runinous competition
by requiring all banks to become national banks,60 subject to
Federal control, and a fortiori the enlargement of their pow-
ers to provide for succession, upon consolidation or transfor-
mation, to the fiduciary functions exercised by constituent
state banks would come within the broad power to establish
and preserve them as useful and successful agencies by pro-
tecting them from unfavorable or discriminatory competi-
tion.01 The Court failed to indicate whether the theory
G6 Acts Nov. 7, 1918, c. 809, Secs. 1, 2, and Dec. 23, 1913, c. 6, Sec. 8; 12
U. S. C. A. Secs. 33, 34, 35, 40 Stat. Secs. 1043, 1044, and 38 Stat. Sec. 258.
57Wilson, Injunctions and 4ttachments .4gainst National Banks (July,
1934), 20 Am. Bar. Assn.'Jour. 399, 401.
58 Wilson, Injunctions and A9ttachments 4gainst National Banks, supra
n. 57. 59 Ex Parte Worchester County Nat. Bank, 279 U. S. 347 (1929).
0 Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533.
61 Casey v. Gall, 94 U. S. 673, Iowa Light Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 250
Mass. 353, Mercantile Trust Co. v. San Joaquin Agricultural Corp., 265 Pac.
583, McElwain v. Primavera, 167 N. Y. S. 815; Chicago Title Co. v. Zinser,
264 Ill. 31, In re Berghoffs Will, 206 N. Y. 309; In re Turner's Estate, 277
Pa. St. 110; Pet. of Bank, 249 Mass. 240, (All cited in briefs filed in Ex Parte
Worchester County Nat. Bank, supra n. 59.)
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advanced met with its approval, but it did declare, quite defi-
nitely, with respect to probate matters, that the purpose of
the Act of 192762 was not to excuse compliance with the regu-
latory statutes of the several states, but to require, instead,
that the consolidated bank account as a fiduciary de son tort
and to apply to the state court for appointment as successor
to the constituent bank. Under the court's decision the obvi-
ous effect of a consolidation is to transfer the property held
by a constituent bank under supervision of a probate court,
to the consolidated bank to be accounted for by the latter,
de son tort, unless the state law recognizes the consolidated
bank. as a qualified successor without formal application or
appointment.
It has been said that, as a corollary to the power to create,
Congress has power "to attach to national banks that which
in its judgment is relevant to make the business of the bank
successful."' 3 It has also been held that Congress has the
power to invest such associations with the right- to qualify
and compete on the same basis with state banks in the exercise
of fiduciary functions, notwithstanding the inhibitions of a
state statute calculated to discriminate against them.64  It
seems to be established also that while Congress is admitted
to have the power to compel the several states to accept
national banks as fiduciaries on an equal basis with state banks,
it is an unwarranted and unconstitutional interference with the
autonomy of a state to attempt to coerce the latter, arbitrar-
ily, to accept a consolidated bank in the place and stead of
its constituent bank as an executor under a will or in any
other peculiarly personal fiduciary capacity, because the dif-
ference in entities and the personal element are factors which
prohibit an involuntary substitution or succession. 5
62 Act of Feb. 25, 1927, c. 91, Sec. 3, 44 Stat. 1224, 1225.
63 First Nat. Bank v. Fellows, supra n. 53.
64 Missouri v. Duncan, 265 U. S. 18, 24, 44 S. Ct. 427, 68 L. Ed. 881
(1924).
60 Ex Parte Worchester County Nat. Bank, supra n. 59; Stevens v. First
Nat. Bank, 173 Ga. 332, 160 S. E. 243 (1931), cert. den. 284- U. S. 684, 52 S. Ct.
201, 76 L. Ed. 578 (1932), Hofheimer v. Seaboard Citizens Nat. Bank, 154
Va. 392, 153 S. E. 656, aff'd: 154- Va. 896, 156 S. E. 581 (1931), cert. den. 283
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The amendments 0 to the Act restate the purpose of Con-
gress in much clearer terms, and provide that the corporate
entity of constituent banks should be deemed to be merged
into and continued in the consolidated association. 7 This
provision removes the possible argument that Congress did
not intend to invest the consolidated bank with the power
sought to be exercised, 6 but it may still be contended with
the support of eminent authority69 that a constituent bank has
no such property right, insofar as trustees and conservators
appointed by probate courts are concerned, as to pass to its
successor national bank by consolidation. This rule was
apparently regarded as an exception to the general rule and
was not invoked by the same Court, however, in a case 70
where a constituent bank was designated as trustee under a
mortgage indenture securing payment of a bond issue. The
Court pointed out that in such a case the rights of the parties
are chiefly contractual in nature, which was apparently deemed
to be such as would pass as an asset to the consolidated bank.
Since there is now no question as to the continuance of the
corporate identity of the constituent bank in the consolidated
bank, it is quite likely that in most cases the courts, hereafter,
will hold, as a general rule (with a few exceptions in cases
of a peculiar type above noted) that the consolidated bank
as an incident to the consolidation succeeds to the fiduciary
rights and duties of the absorbed bank.71
U. S. 855, 51 S. Ct. 648, 75 L. Ed. 1462 (1931). Contra: In re Barreiros Es-
tate, 125 Cal. App. 153, 13 P. (2d) 1017, 1024 (1932), Adams v. Atlantic Nat.
Bank, 115 Fla. 399, 155 So. 648 (1934), Alt v. Liberty Nat. Bank, 260 Ky.
87, 83 S. W (2d) S66 (1935).
66 12 U. S. C. A. Supp. 1935, Secs. 33, 34a.
67 12 U. S. C. A. Supp. 1935, Sec. 34a.
08 Petition of Commonwealth-Atlantic Nat. Bank, 249 Mass. 440, 144 N.
E. 443, cert. den. 266 U. S. 617, 45 S. Ct. 98, 69 L. Ed. 470.
69 Petition of Commonwealth-Atlantic Nat. Bank, 261 Mass. 217, 158 N. E.
780 (1927), holding that the designation of a bank as a fiduciary by a probate
court is not a property right in which it has a vested right.
70 Iowa Light, Heat & Power Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 250 Mass. 353, 354,
145 N. E. 433 (1924). Accord. First Nat. Bank v. Chapman, 160 Tenn. 72,
22 S. V (2d) 245 (1929), Bayer v. Barrett, 71 Cal. App. 620, 15 P. (2d)
801 (1932).
71 Wilson, Injunctions and Attachments Against Nattonal Banks, 20 Am.
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VIII
INSOLVENCY AND RECEIVERS
A
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation-Its Functions and
Duties-The Banking Act of 1935.72
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the Comp-
troller of Currency is required to appoint the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation as receiver of a closed bank if it be an
insured national bank.73  Likewise, the Corporation is em-
powered and directed to accept appointments as receiver of
closed state banks where authorized by state law.74  On fail-
ure of insured national banks, provision is made for payment
of the insured deposits immediately by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation which, in turn, is subrogated to the
claim of the depositor so paid. In other insured banks the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is forbidden to make
payments of insured deposits until the rights of the depositors
receiving the benefits of the insurance are transferred to the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in a satisfactory
manner, either by assignment, operation of law of the state,
order of court or otherwise.75
Supervision over such closed national banks is still retained
by the Comptroller and he is given wide discretion in waiving
compliance by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to
regulatory provisions applying, in general, to receivers.76
The Act of 1935 will make the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation receiver of practically every national bank here-
after closed, and, with several of the states already permitting
or directing that the Corporation be made receiver of closed
Bar Assn. Jour. 402 n. 62 (July, 1934), First Nat. Bank v. Fellows, supra n. 53;
Missouri v. Duncan, supra n. 64.
72 Breckenndge, The Banking Act of 1935, 22 Am. Bar Assn. Jour. 93
(Feb. 1936).
73 12 U. S. C. A. Supp. 1935, Sec. 264L(3).
74 12 U. S. C. A. Supp. 1935, Sec. 264L(5).
75 12 U. S. C. A. Supp. 1935, Sec. 264-L(7).
76 12 U. S. C. A. Supp. 1935, Sec. 264M(1).
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state banks, it is quite likely that ultimately nearly all closed
banks in the country will be administered by the Corporation
under supervision of the Comptroller of Currency.7
The general provisions of the National Bank Act relating
to administration of insolvent associations, except as modified
by the Act of 1933, are retained and made applicable where
the affairs of the association are wound up by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation .7 Little change has been
effected in the substantive law governing insolvent national
banks. The status of the receiver as a Federal instrumental-
ity or Federal officer 70 as distinguished from that as an officer
of a court ° has not been changed, so that the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, in its capacity as receiver, will retain
its character as an executive administrative agency of the
Federal Government.
B
Shareholders' Stock Atssessment Liability
The Act of June 16, 1933, as amended by the Act of Au-
gust 23, 1935,81 exempts stockholders from liability on shares
of stock issued subsequent to June 16, 1933, and provides
further that stockholders' liability on shares of stock in a
bank transacting business on July 1, 1937, shall then cease
if notice of prospective termination of such liability is pub-
lished as provided by the law. No relief is afforded stock-
holders who, prior to June 16, 1933, became owners of shares
in a bank which shall have been closed prior to July 1, 1937.
77 Breckenridge, The Banking Act of 1935. 22 Am. Bar Assn. Jour. 93, 95
(Feb., 1936).
78 12 U. S. C. A. Supp. 1935, See. 264L(4).
79 Ex Parte Chetwood, 165 U. S. 443, 17 S. Ct. 385, 41 L. Ed. 782; Auten
v. U. S. Nat. Bank, 178 U. S. 125, 19 S. Ct. 628, 43 L. Ed. 920; Port Newark
Nat. Bank v. Waldron, 46 F (2d) 296; Liberty Nat. Bank v. McIntosh, 16
F (2d) 906, pet. cert. dism. 273 U. S. 769, 783, 43 S. Ct. 571, 71 L. Ed. 890;
Steele v. Randall, 19 F (2d) 40.
80 Lehman v. Spurway, 58 F (2d) 227 (1932), cert. den. 287 U. S. 621,
53 S. Ct. 20, 77 L. Ed. 539; Hulse v. Argetsinger, 18 F (2d) 944 (1927);
Wittnebel v. Loughman, 9 F Supp. 465 (1935), aff'd. 80 F (2d) 222 (1935),
Wilson v. Await, 2 F Supp. 465 (1933).
81 12 U. S. C. A. Supp. 1935, Sec. 64(a), 49 Stat. 708.
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This change in the law obviates, for practical purposes, the
necessity of reviewing the many interesting cases involving
stock assessment suits.
C
Effect of Insolvency on Status of Association-.pplicability
of State Laws-Bank Collection Code-Liens-
Preference Claims
It is definitely settled that the insolvency of a national
bank and the appointment of a receiver to wind up its affairs
does not work a dissolution of the corporation, nor affect
suits pending against it, nor prevent it suing or being sued. 2
Since the National Bank Act created a complete system
for the winding up of such associations, the Federal law from
the moment of suspension becomes the law governing the
administration of closed national banks to the exclusion of
the law of any state.8 3  No state, by way of complement to
the Act, may prescribe additional or auxiliary provisions af-
fecting the administration of such banks.84 Hence, a state
law attempting to create a lien 5 or preference under the
Uniform Bank Collection Code 6 has no application to an
insolvent national bank. Likewise, it is beyond the poyer of
a state probate court to try to circumvent the Federal law
by declaring a preference with respect to a ward's funds in
disregard of the requirement that the necessary elements of
82 City of Marion v. Sneeden, supra n. 17 (1935), Earle v. Pennsylvania,
178 U. S. 449, 20 S. Ct. 915, 44 L. Ed. 1146, Chemical Nat. Bank v. Hartford
Deposit Co., 161 U. S. 1, 16 S. Ct. 439, 40 L. Ed. 595, Rosenblatt v. Johnston,
104 U. S. 462, 463, 20 L. Ed. 832; Bethel Bank v. Pahquioque, 14 Wall. 383,
20 L. Ed. 840; Bailen v. Deitrick, 84 F (2d) 375 (1936), Wittnebel v.
Loughman, supra n. 80; Bereth v. Sparks, 51 F (2d) 441, and cases cited in 12
U. S. C: A. Sec. 192 n. 21.
83 First Nat. Bank v. Missouri, 263 U. S. 640; Easton v. Iowa, 188 U. S.
220; Davis v. Elmira, 161 U. S. 265, 16 S. Ct. 502, 40 L. Ed. 700; Cook County
Nat. Bank v. U. S., 107 U. S. 445, 2 S. Ct. 561, 27 L. Ed. 537, Farmers Bank
v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29; First Nat. Bank v. Selden, 120 Fed. 212.
84Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U. S. 536, Calcasieu Nat. Bank v. Calcasieu
Bank, 83 F (2d) 742 (1936).
85 Spradlin v. Royal Man'fg. Co., 73 F (2d) 776.
86 Old Lehigh v. Meeker, 294 U. S. 227, 55 S. Ct. 392, 79 L. Ed. 876 (1935),
Jennings v. U. S. F & G. Co., 294 U. S. 216, 55 S. Ct. 394, 79 L. Ed. 869, 99
A. L. R. 1248 (1935).
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augmentation and identification of the trust res be estab-
lished.87
Liens arising by state law prior to suspension, such as an
attorney's retaining lien, are not invalidated by the appoint-
ment of a receiver because he is chargeable with the assets
as he finds them and takes them subject to valid liens,88 but
such liens can not be created subsequent to suspension, before
a receiver is appointed, 89 nor at any time after suspension.
The ratable distribution provision91 prevents allowance of
preferences on any claim except for monies to reimburse the
United States for advances to redeem the circulating notes
of the bank,92 and for assets which are traced and identified
as belonging to another. Deposits by a trustee in bankruptcy
in a closed bank are not subject to summary order of the
Bankruptcy Court, since they are only general claims. 93 Like-
wise, deposits by receivers of state banks,94 clerks of state
courts, 5 receivers in equity,98 deposits by order of court,97
and deposits of funds held in escrow98 have all been held to be
no more than general claims.
D
Claims for Rent-Provability of Claim for Damages for
Anticipatory Breach
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the right to
prove a claim for an existing demand at the moment of in-
87 In re West Side-Atlas Nat. Bank (O'Connell v. Mitchell), 78 F (2d) 395.
88 Earle v. Pennsylvania, 178 U. S. 449, 20 S. Ct. 915, 44 L. Ed. 1146, Scott
v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499, 13 S. Ct. 148, 36 L. Ed. 1059; Webster v. Sweat,
65 F (2d) 109 (1933). 89 Steele v. Randall, 19 F. (2d) 40.
90 Cooper v. McNair, 49 F (2d) 778 (attorney fees).
91R. S. Sec. 5236; 12 U. S. C. A. Sec. 194.
02Davis v. Elmira, supra n. 2; Cook County Nat. Bank v. U. S., supra
n. 83, First Nat. Bank v. Selden, 120 Fed. 212.
93 Union Guardian Nat. Bank v. Guardian Nat. Bank (In re George Mort
Art Calendar Co.), 78 F (2d) 529, cert. den. - U. S. -, 80 L. Ed. 119 (Oct.
1935) ; In re Bogema v. Williams, 76 F. (2d) 950; In re Eckklund, 75 F (2d)
747; Hillsdale Grocery Co. v. Union Peoples Nat. Bank, 6 F Supp. 773.
04 Griffin v. Royal, 70 F (2d) 103 (1934) , Isaacs v. Stock, 66 F (2d) 928.
95 Eckerson v. Utter, 78 F. (2d) 307 (1935).
9aUBridge v. First Nat. Bank, 5 F Supp. 442 (1933).
97 Keyes v. Paducah, 61 F (2d) 611, 86 A. L. R. 203 (1932).
08 Atlantic Gypsum Co. v. Federal Nat. Bank, 76 F (2d) 59 (1935).
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solvency, based upon a breach of a covenant to pay rent,90
and has recognized the rule that the intervention of bank-
ruptcy constitutes a disablement constituting an anticipatory
breach of a contract relating to personalty, giving rise
to a provable claim, 100 yet, it seems settled, now, that there is
such a difference between contracts relating to personalty and
contracts involving lands that default prior to suspension is
a necessary prerequisite to establishing a claim against an
insolvent national bank for breach of a lease contract. 1' 1
Where there is no default prior to suspension the receiver
may repudiate the lease without incurring liability to his trust,
especially where the lease does not provide for payment of a
sum certain in case of its termination before the date fixed
therein. 10 2  A claim is provable for ascertainable damages
existing at the moment of insolvency, but not for contingent
or speculative damages for anticipatory breach.
10 3
E
Preferred Claims on Funds Held by Bank as Constructive
Trustee, Trustee Ex Maleficio, or Agent
PReferred claims, as is indicated above, are quite rare, but
many cases have come before the courts in the last few years
wherein attempts have been made to establish a constructive
trust or a trust ex maleficzo, and to impress a trust upon the
assets of the insolvent bank coming into the hands of the re-
ceiver, with the result that the law is now well settled to the
extent that before such so-called preferences can be estab-
lished, it is necessary to show: (1) a trust or agency relation-
ship, (2) an augmentation of assets coming into the receiver's
hands, and, (3) identification of the funds or res in the re-
90 Chemical Nat. Bank v. Hartford Deposit Co., supra n. 82.
100 Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Assn., 240 U. S. 582.
101 Wells v. Twenty First St. Ry. Co., 12 F (2d) 237, Fidelity Safe De-
posit Co. v. Armstrong, 35 Fed. 567, Kennedy v. Boston Continental, 11 F
Supp. 611 (1935), judgment modified and vacated. 84 F (2d) 592 (1936).
Docketed U. S. Supreme Court.
102 First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. First Nat. Bank of Wheaton, 78 F. (2d)
503 (1935), cert. den. 296 U. S. 561, 80 L. Ed. 283 (Dec. 17, 1935).
103 Kennedy v. Boston Continental, supra n. 101, modified and vacated.
Kennedy v. Boston-Continental, 84 F (2d) 592 (1936), Boston-Continental v.
Wendell Phillips, 84 F (2d) 599 (1936).
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ceiver's hands.104  A shifting of credits is not sufficient to
establish the augmentation required to be proven,10 5 but the
Supreme Court, by way of dictum, has intimated that it would
adhere to the doctrine of "fungible goods" with respect to
confused and commingled cash of the wrongdoer to the extent
that it will not permit a trust ex maleficto to fail because such
cash is confounded in a common fund. 10 However, the pro-
visions of the Uniform Bank Collection Code can have no
application to insolvent national banks and do not, therefore,
excuse the necessity of proving actual augmentation and trac-
ing the identifiable res.1 7
F
Transfers in Contemplation of Insolvency-Acts of Insolv-
ency-Knowledge of Transferee
The National Bank Act forbids transfers after commission
of an act of insolvency, in contemplation of insolvency, or
with a view to preferring one creditor over another, or
transfers to prevent the application of the bank's assets as
required by law. 08 This injunction renders void the creation
of a lien, whether by state statute or otherwise, which would
104 Old Lehigh v. Meeker, supra n. 86 (1935); Jennings v. U. S. F & G.
Co., supra n. 86 (1935) ; Blakey v. Brinson, 286 U. S. 254, 52 S. Ct. 516, 76 L.
Ed. 1089, 82 A. L. R. 1288 (1932), Adams v. Champion, 294 U.S. 231, 55 S. Ct.
399, 78 L. Ed. 880 (1935), Kershaw v. Jenkins, 71 F (2d) 647 (1934), Poole
v. Elliott, 76 F (2d) 772 (1935), O'Neal v. White, 79 F (2d) 835 (1935),
Fulton v. Evans, 79 F (2d) 718 (1935), Stonebraker v. First Nat. Bank, 76
F (2d) 389 (1935), Brownell v. Turman, 75 F (2d) 1913 (1935), Thompson
v. School Dist., 67 F. (2d) 284; Swan v. Children's Home Soc., 67 F (2d) 84,
cert. den. 290 U. S. 704, 54 S. Ct. 372, 78 L. Ed. 605 (1934); Marshburn v.
Williams, 15 F (2d) 589; Converse v. Continental, 12 F Supp. 887.
105 Jennings v. U. S. F & G. Co., supra n. 86 (1935), O'Neal v. White,
supra n. 104 (1935), Lifsey v. Goodyear, 67 F (2d) (1933).
100Adams v. Champion, supra n. 104 (1935); Jennings v. U. S. F & G.
Co., supra n. 86 (1935), Blakey v. Brinson, supra n. 104 (1932), Schumacher v.
Harriett, 52 F. (2d) 821 (1934).
107 Jennings v. U. S. F. & G. Co., supra n. 86 (1935), Old Lehigh v.
Meeker, supra n. 86 (1935), Calcasieu Nat. Bank v. Calcasieu Bank, 83 F.
(2d) 742 (1936).
108R. S. Sec. 5242; 12 U. S. C. A., See. 91.
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in effect prefer one creditor over another, if in violation of the
spirit of the Act.10 9
By way of illustration, an "act of insolvency" occurs when
a bank fails to meet its obligations in the ordinary course of
business, 110 when the board of directors adopts a resolution
to suspend operations,"' when the officers turn over the bank
to the Comptroller, 112 or when the bank delivers over its
assets to a depositor to prevent a disastrous withdrawal of
funds." 3
The purpose of the Act is to assure a ratable distribution
of assets," 4 and a transfer is "in contemplation of insolvency"
when the officers, knowing, or chargeable with knowing, its
failing condition, permits withdrawals calculated to, or having
the effect of, defeating a ratable distribution. 15  It is imma-
terial whether the transferee has any knowledge of the bank's
condition, or innocent of the unlawful effect of the transfer," 6
109 Davis v. Elmira, supra n. 2; Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499; Na-
tional Security Bank v. Butler, 129 U. S. 223, 9 S. Ct. 281, 32 L. Ed. 682; Selma-
v. Colby First Nat. Bank, 21 Wall. 609, 22 L. Ed. 687, Bailey v. Mosher, 63
Fed. 488, Roberts v. Hill, 24 Fed. 571, Pearson v. Durell, 77 F (2d) 465, cert.
den. (Durell v. Pearson), 296 U. S. 606, 56 S. Ct. 122 (1935).
lO6Aycock v. Bradbury, 77 F (2d) 14 (1935), Roberts v. Hill, supra n.
109.
Ill Hirning v. Fed. Res. Bank, 52 F (2d) 382 (1930).
112 Smith v. Baldwin, 69 F (2d) 390 (1934).
13 Brill v. McInnes, 14 F (2d) 306.
114 Scott v. Armstrong, supra n. 109; Selma v. Colby First Nat. Bank,
supra n. 109; Fed. Res. Bank v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 45 F (2d) 511, cert. den.
54 S. Ct. 215 (1934), Aycock v. Bradbury, supra n. 110 (1935), Pearson v.
Durell, supra n. 109 (1935), Steele v. Randall, 19 F (2d) 401; Hayden v.
Thompson, 71 Fed. 60, 65.
115 McDonald v. Chemical Nat. Bank, 174 U. S. 610, 19 S. Ct. 787, 43 L.
Ed. 1106, National Security Bank v. Butler, supra n. 109; Mechanics Universal
Joint Co. v. Culhane, 80 F (2d) 147 (1935); Pearson v. Durell, supra n. 109
(1935), Nelson v. Lewis, 73 F (2d) 521 (1934), Isaacs v. Stock, 66 F (2d)
928, American Surety Co. v. Jackson, 24 F (2d) 768, Brill v. McInnes, supra
n. 113, Brown v. Stronach, 7 F (2d) 685, Ball v. German Bank, 187 Fed. 750,
753, cert. den. 225 U. S. 709, 32 S. Ct. 840, 56 L. Ed. 1267, Roberts v. Hill,
supra n. 109.
116 Kullman v. Wooley, 83 F. (2d) 129 (1936); Salem Trust Co. v. Fed-
eral Nat. Bank, 78 F (2d) 407 (1935), Aycock v. Bradbury, supra n. 110
(1935), First Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 57 F (2d) 17, Ball v. German Bank,
supra n. 115, But see: Rucker v. Kokrda, 68 F (2d) 73 (1933).
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and the intent of the officers to give a preference is presumed
where they know of the bank's failing condition, or, not know-
ing, are presumed to know, if, from the circumstances, they
would contemplate it.1 1 7 Transactions "in the ordinary
course of business", while the bank is technically insolvent
but still carrying on as usual in the hope of remainig open, do
not come within the inhibitions of the Act and are valid. 118
G
Set-Off: Mutuality as Necessary Basis-Set Off of Deposit
of Trustee or Receiver in Bankruptcy 4gainst Dividends
Due Bank On Its Clazin Against Bankrupt
The right of set-off is governed by the conditions of things
existing at the moment of insolvency and not by circumstances
thereafter created." 9  Claims acquired after insolvency, by
assignment or otherwise, can not be used for an offset, 120 but
the immaturity of a claim need not prevent its being used
as the basis of a set-off. 121  Mutuality must exist before claims
may be set-off, and this means that the debts or credits must
be mutual or reciprocal, existing between the same persons
117 Nelson v. Lewis, supra n. 115 (1934), Aycock v. Bradbury, supra n.
110 (1935); Brill v. McInnes, supra n. 113; Roberts v. Hill, supra n. 109;
Browne v. Stronach, supra n. 115, First Nat. Bank v. Andresen, 57 F (2d) 17,
Ball v. German Bank, supra n. 115.
118 Easton v. Iowa, 188 U. S. 220, 23 S. Ct. 288, 47 L. Ed. 452; McDonald
v. Chemical Nat. Bank, supra n. 115. (Transactions held not to be in ordinary
course of business: Offering depositor choice of securities in lieu of deposit
on imminence of withdrawal,-Aycock v. Bradbury, supra n. 110; Pledges to
secure deposits,-Parks v. Knapp, 29 F. (2d) 547 and cases cited supra n. 17
& 18, Transfer of assets to a creditor in settlement of deposit liability,--
Ball v. German Bank, supra n. 115, National Security Bank v. Butler, supra
n. 109.)
110 Dakin v. Bayly, 290 U. S. 143, 78 L. Ed. 229, 90 A. L. R. 999 (1933),
Merrill v. Nat. Bank, 173 U. S. 131, 19 S. Ct. 360, 43 L. Ed. 640; Yardley v.
Philler, 167 U. S. 344, 17 S. Ct. 835, 42 L. Ed. 192; U. S. v. Knox, 111 U. S.
784, 4 S. Ct. 686, 28 L. Ed. 603; First Nat. Bank v. Malone, 76 F (2d) 251
(1935), McCandless v. Dyar, 34 F. (2d) 989; Yardley v. Clothier, 51 Fed.
506, 17 L. R. A. 462; Hudson v. Thomas, 6 F Supp. 857.
120 Scott v. Armstrong, supra n. 109; First Nat. Bank v. Malone, 76 F
(2d) 251 (1935).
121 Scott v. Armstrong, supra n. 109.
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at the same time in the same capacities, as a general rule, 122
but the Act does not require the strict mutuality at law so as
to deprive depositors of equitable offsets if sufficient basis
exists in equity therefor.12 3  Accordingly, an indorser ordinar-
ily can not set off his liability against his deposit claim 1 24 al-
though the contrary has also been held. 2 5 Rent falling due
after insolvency can not be used to set off against a liability
existing at the moment of insolvency;126 nor can a deposit or
other claim against the bank be set off against a stock liabil-
ity,127 but the dividends due him on his claim may be set off
against his stock liability,128 even though the debtor had
assigned his claim after suspension but before the stock assess-
ment levy was made. 12 9  In order to prevent injustice, where a
secured creditor is also liable as a stockholder, the two claims
may be set off in equity. 130
An interesting question 3 arises where a receiver or trus-
tee in bankruptcy deposits funds of the insolvent's or bank-
rupt's estate in a bank which is also a creditor of the insolvent
or bankrupt, and such bank subsequently closes. The great
weight of authority is that the claim of the bank against the
122Wasson v. White, 12 F (2d) 809; Poisson v. Williams, 15 F (2d)
582 (1926), Richmond v. Litteer, 1 F (2d) 311, In re United Grocery Co.,
253 Fed. 267, Peurifoy v. Gamble, 145 S. C. 1, 142 S. E. 788, 71 A. L. R. 783.
123Roelker v. Bromley-Shepard Co., 73 F (2d) 618 (1934), cert. den.
294 U. S. 713, 55 S. Ct. 509, 79 L. Ed. - (1935) , Gray v. School Dist., 67 F
(2d) 141, cert. den. (Hustead v. School Dist.), 291 U. S. 660, 54 S. Ct. 377, 78
L. Ed. 1052 (1935), Broomfield v. Trinidad, 36 F (2d) 646, Hudson v. Thom-
as, 6 F (2d) 857.
124 Shannon v. Sutherland, 74 F (2d) 530 (1935) ; Bryant v. Williams,
16 F (2d) 159.
125 Williams v. Rose, 218 Fed. 898, Yardley v. Clothier, 51 Fed. 506, 17
L. R. A. 462.
126 Standard Oil Co. v. Elliott, 80 F (2d) 158 (1935).
127 Lantry v. Wallace, 182 U. S. 536, 21 S. Ct. 878, 45 L. Ed. 1218, Roth
v. Baldwin, 74 F (2d) 1003, cert. den. 295 U. S. 737 (1935), Williams v.
Rose, supra n. 125.
128 Roth v. Baldwin, supra n. 127.
129 King v. Armstrong, 50 Ohio St. 222, 34 N. E. 163.
130 Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Rawlings, 76 F (2d) 566 (1935).
131 Parker, J. "Bankruptcy and Bank Deposits", Commercial Law Jour.
(Dec., 1934), p. 621 (Address of Hon. John J. Parker, U. S. Cir. Ct. (4th)
before conference of Referees in Bankruptcy.)
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insolvent or bankrupt can not be set off against the trustee or
receiver on the deposit claim. 1 32  However, there is a conflict
of authority, even in the Federal courts, as to the right of the
trustee or receiver to set off the dividends due the bank
against the bank's liability on the deposit-the Supreme
Court 3 3 and one Circuit Court of Appeals 34 in cases involv-
ing state banks, having followed the rule that such an offset
is proper, while another Federal court, 13 5 in a case involving
a controversy between a national bank receiver and a trustee
in bankruptcy followed the general rule and denied the offset.
The Hood case' 3 6 declares that the deposit and the liability
for dividends in bankruptcy are mutual claims-that the trus-
tee's liability to the bank is not for the face of the claim, but
for dividends which may be declared on it; that it is quite
equitable that against this liability he be allowed to set off
the deposit which was made by him in the same capacity as
that in which he is charged with liability for payment of divi-
dends, that the funds in the bank until suspension were subject
to summary control of the bankruptcy court; that the bank
and other creditors had an equal interest therein; that when
the bank closed the bankruptcy court was precluded from
summarily recovering the deposit and, therefore, it would be
inequitable and unjust to the other creditors of the bankrupt
to permit the bank to receive additional funds in the way
of dividends from the bankrupt estate until all the other cred-
itors are placed in position to share on an equal basis, and it
132 Peurifoy v. Gamble, 145 S. C. 1, 142 S. E. 788, 71 A. L. R. 783 and
cases there cited. (In 71 A. L. R. at p. 808, the annotator, either erroneously
or inadvertently, discusses the Gardner case, ibid. n. 133, as authority for a
set-off of deposit against the claim of the bank against the bankrupt, whereas
the case turns on right to set-off dividends due the bank on its claim against
the bank's deposit liability.)
'33 Gardner v. Chicago Title & Tr. Co., 261 U. S. 453, 43 S. Ct. 424, 67
L. Ed. 741, 29 A. L. R. 622 (1923).
34 Hood v. Brownlee, 62 F (2d) 675, 22 Am. B. R. (N. S.) 441 (1933).
See also: In re Wingert, 16 F Supp. 873 (Nov. 6, 1936).
135 In re United Grocery Co., 253 Fed. 267. Cf. Richmond Ins. Co. v.
Litteer, 1 F (2d) 311, and Wasson v. White, 12 F (2d) 809 (involving re-
ceivers of national banks). But see: In re Wingert, 16 F Supp. 873 (Nov. 6,
1936).
130 Supra n. 134.
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is concluded that to permit the bank to collect its dividends
while indebted to the trustee for funds in which the other
creditors have an equal right would accord the bank an unfair
advantage.
On the other hand, it is argued that the ratable distribution
mandate of the Act guarantees to all creditors of the bank
the same treatment, without preference, and that when the
bank closed, the trustee became a general creditor, entitled
to no more rights than any other general creditor; that the
claim of the bank is an asset out of which ratable dividends
should be paid all creditors of the bank; that nothing subse-
quent to insolvency could enlarge or diminish the right of such
creditors to those ratable dividends; that at the moment of
insolvency there could be nothing to set off against the deposit
liability except the liability of the trustee to pay dividends,
which is speculative and unascertainable, and could only be
determined by conditions arising subsequent to insolven-
cy;1361 that to accord the trustee the right to set off would
prevent the bank's receiver and the bank's creditors from
realizing anything on the bank's claim until the trustee was
repaid in full; that such procedure would amount to the same
thing as a preference and violate the purpose of the Act to
guarantee a ratable distribution. Such is the reasoning of the
Unted Grocery case,13 7 and it is the only137 % case involving
a controversy between an insolvent national bank and a trustee
in bankruptcy growing out of a dispute over the effect of
similar provisions of two codes which, at first blush, appear
conflicting in operation.13  Since the Hood 39 and Gardner140
136 Peurifoy v. Gamble, supra n. 132 and cases cited 71 A. L. R. 806.
137 Supra n. 135.
137% A recent District Court case is to contrary- In re Wingert, 16 F
Supp. 873 (Nov., 1936).
138 Cf. R. S. Sec. 5236, 12 U. S. C. A. Sec. 194, and Sec. 68a Bankruptcy
Act; 30 Stat. 541, 11 U. S. C. A. Sec. 108. (In Cumberland Glass Co. v. De-
Witt, 237 U. S. 447, 35 S. Ct. 636, 59 L. Ed. 1042, it was held that Sec. 68a
of the Bankruptcy Act is permissive only, not mandatory, and only recognizes
the general rule of set-off enabling the courts to invoke the principle to mutual
credits.)
139 Supra n. 134.
140Supra n. 133.
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cases were not concerned with the ratable distribution man-
date of the National Bak Act, those cases are not exactly
controlling, and may very well be distinguished from the
United Grocery case, 141 which, on the precise question in-
volved, correctly denied the offset claimed.
Let us suppose that a receiver of a state bank deposited
funds in a national bank which was a creditor of the insolvent
state bank, and assuming that later on the national bank sus-
pended, could it logically be contended that the receiver of
the state bank, as a general creditor, has any greater rights
than any other general creditors? The state bank receiver
would come within the general rule denying him any right to
retain and apply dividends, and it would seem that a trustee
in bankruptcy stands in an analogous position without greater
favor or equities.
It is submitted, as the most equitable solution, and one
which may be adopted without violating the ratable distribu-
tion requirements, that an offset be allowed on the following
basis: (1) determine what proportion the bank's claim
bears to the total of all claims of creditors against the bank-
rupt estate, and from this computation reckon the amount
of the beneficial interest of the bank itself in the deposit of
the trustee, and set off that beneficial interest in the deposit
against its deposit liability; (2) if the bank, at suspension,
is entitled to dividends already declared but not delivered
over to it by the trustee, those dividends should be set off
against the deposit liability because they would be mutual de-
mands; (3) all further dividends declared by the bankrupt
estate upon the net balance of the bank's claim should be
withheld by the trustee and set off against the deposit until
same is fully satisfied; (4) in the meantime, any dividends
paid on the deposit should be delivered to the trustee for
distribution to the other creditors of the bankrupt's estate,
without the bank participating therein; and (5) after the
deposit liability is fully discharged, the bank would participate
ratably on the balance of its claim in the remaining general
assets of the estate. Under this plan the bank would get the
14 1Supra n. 135.
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benefit of an equitable offset of its beneficial interest in the
deposit, but would not receive more than its share because
the dividends on the deposit would be transferred to a special
fund by the trustee, for the exclusive distribution of dividends
to the other creditors. In this manner the bank would not
receive a double benefit, or advantage in the deposit, nor
would the other creditors of the bankrupt receive an iidvan-
tage over the bank in the general assets of the bankrupt
estate. Therefore, it appears that full force and effect is
given to the equities of all parties, and the ratable distribution
rights of the respective claimants are preserved inviolate.
The Banking Act of 1935, as we have already shown, sub-
rogates the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to the
right of the depositor to the extent of his insured deposit,
upon payment by the Corporation of the insured portion of
the deposit.142  Moreover, the Act provides that the Corpo-
ration "may withhold payment of such portion of the insured
deposit of any depositor in a closed bank as may be required
to provide for the payment of any liability of such depositor
as a stockholder of the closed bank, or of any liability of such
depositor to the closed bank, or its receiver, which is not offset
against a claim due from such bank, pending the determina-
tion and payment of such liability by such depositor or any
other person liable therefor.' 143  (Italics mine). If a depos-
itor has a deposit exceeding the insured amount, and is in-
debted to the bank for less than the insured amount, there
may be some question whether the insured portion, i. e., the
first $5,000, shall be used to accomplish the offset, leaving the
depositor a general claim for the uninsured balance, or
whether the phrase, "such portion of the insured deposit ...
which is not offset against a claim . . .", has reference to the
whole deposit, entitling the depositor to use the uninsured
portion first toward effecting the offset, then so much of the
insured part as is necessary, and leaving to him the remaining
portion fully insured.
142 12 U. S. C. A. Supp. 1935, Sec. 264L(7).
143 12 U. S. C. A. Supp. 1935, See. 264M(4-).
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No doubt this provision was incorporated in the Act in
recognition of the right to set off, and to protect the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation. At the same time, the gen-
eral purpose of the Act to provide insurance protection to the
depositor must be given effect. It seems likely, then, that
the language employed will be given a construction which
will afford the Corporation the right to enter on its records,
in the receivership, an offset of the excess over $5,000 plus
any amount of the first $5,000 required, to accomplish the
offset, and, since it would then owe nothing on the part offset,
it could withhold payment of the insured balance until the
offset so made is made conclusive by consent or otherwise.
If this were not the rule, the Corporation could use all or as
much of the first $5,000 necessary to offset against the de-
positor's liability, and make him take a common claim for
the balance of his deposit, if his deposit and liability each
exceeds $5,000. The general purpose of the Act does not
admit of the adoption of any such fantastic construction be-
cause in such a situation a depositor would not receive the
benefit of any insurance.
It may be, since deposits can not be offset against stock
liability, or indirect liabilities, or other liabilities lacking the
required mutuality to warrant an offset, that the payment
of any porton of the insured deposit (first $5,000) which is
not required to offset against his direct or mutual liabilities,
may be withheld until the debtor discharges his other liabili-
ties. If this construction is adopted, it would neither alter
the established rule as to the required basis for an offset, nor
deprive the depositor of his insurance; but, if it is contem-
plated that by withholding the practical effect of an offset
may be accomplished, then a revolutionary innovation has
been introduced in the law of offsets.
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